

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00596 01 OF 02 011149Z

45

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

SAM-01 ACDA-19 EB-11 DPW-01 NIC-01 DRC-01 /159 W

----- 033987

O R 011042Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1351

INFO AMEMASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 0596

BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF

SUBJ: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT COMES NEXT

SUMMARY: ISRAELI LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL COMMENTATORS
BELIEVE THAT DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT PROVIDES ISRAEL WITH
BREATHING SPACE TO REASSESS ITS STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES.
DAYAN AND OTHERS REPORTEDLY HOPE THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER
DIPLOMATIC MOVES WITH EGYPT UNTIL SINCERITY OF SADAT'S INTENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00596 01 OF 02 011149Z

TO REOPEN CANAL AND REHABILITATE CITIES IS DEMONSTRATED. AS TO

NEXT STAGE AFTER DISENGAGEMENT, THERE IS NO SINGLE VIEW. SOME COMMENTATORS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL SHOULD STAY ON MITLA-GIDI DISENGAGEMENT LINE UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON FINAL WITHDRAWAL LINE IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT WHILE OTHERS ENVISAGE FURTHER INCREMENTAL WITHDRAWALS IN EXCHANGE FOR TANGIBLE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CONCESSIONS. MOST ISRAELIS SEE NEXT STEP AS US EFFORT TO ACHIEVE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, BUT THEY ATTACH LESS URGENCY TO THIS THAN TO DISENGAGEMENT WITH EGYPT. IDF CURRENTLY COMMANDS STRONG STRATEGIC POSITION AND TOPOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN FRONT MAKES DISENGAGEMENT LESS IMPERATIVE PROSPECT THAN IN SINAI. MAIN ISRAELI INTEREST IN DISENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA REMAINS RETURN OF POWS. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE SO FAR THAT ISRAELIS HAVE YET CRYSTALLIZED THEIR THINKING RE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN EXCEPT FOR ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO SEPARATE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. DISPOSITION OF WEST BANK REMAINS VOLATILE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH LABOR ALIGNMENT WANTS TO DEFER AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT. ISRAELI APPROACH TO NEXT STAGE REMAINS CONDITIONED ULTIMATELY BY DEEP SUSPICION OF ARAB--AND SOVIET--INTENTIONS. GENERAL VIEW THAT DIPLOMATIC MOVES WILL SLOW DOWN RESTS ON IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION THAT GOI CAN TO SOME EXTENT CONTROL PACE AND DIRECTION OF EVENTS. END SUMMARY.

1. EGYPT. IN WAKE OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, DOMINANT ASSUMPTION AMONG ISRAELI LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL COMMENTATORS IS THAT ISRAEL HAS BOUGHT CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO CONSIDER WHERE TO GO WITH EGYPT FROM HERE. ISRAELIS IN GENERAL SEEM TO FEEL NEED TO SLOW DOWN PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT AND TEST SADAT'S SINCERITY IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PART OF BARGAIN. DESPITE RECENT STATEMENTS BY DAYAN THAT SADAT MAY HAVE FINALLY SET HIS GOAL AS PEACE WITH ISRAEL INSTEAD OF WAR, UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION ON PART OF MOST ISRAELIS CONTINUES TO BE PROFOUND DISTRUST OF EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS WITH FEAR THAT SADAT WILL ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE BY POLITICAL MEANS WHAT HE FAILED TO GAIN MILITARILY.

2. AS REGARDS EGYPT, IMMEDIATE ISRAELI FOCUS AT THIS POINT IN TIME IS ON ACTUAL MECHANICS OF DISENGAGEMENT--ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK OF CANAL, ANTICIPATION OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00596 01 OF 02 011149Z

THINNING OUT OF EGYPTIAN SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES AS FIRST TEST OF EGYPT'S SINCERITY IN IMPLEMENTING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, AND OBSERVATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT EGYPT WILL DISMANTLE ALL MISSILE SITES IN AGREED AREAS. ONCE DISENGAGEMENT IS COMPLETED, HOWEVER, THERE SEEMS TO BE GREAT TENTATIVENESS AND UNCERTAINTY ON NEXT STAGE OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN AND OTHERS REPORTEDLY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER

DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT ON THIS FRONT UNTIL SADAT DEMONSTRATES HIS STATED INTENTION TO REOPEN SUEZ CANAL AND REHABILITATE CANAL CITIES. BASED ON INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL COMMENTATORS, ISRAELIS SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THESE PROJECTS WILL TAKE 8-10 MONTHS, IF NOT LONGER, BEFORE THERE IS DISCERNIBLE PROGRESS.

3. BEYOND THIS, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO DOMINANT LINE OF THOUGHT AS TO SHAPE AND FORM OF NEXT STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT. SOME COMMENTATORS HAVE STATED THAT INCREMENTAL WITHDRAWALS IN SINAI ARE NOT IN ISRAEL'S BEST INTERESTS AND THAT, THEREFORE, ISRAEL SHOULD SIT ON MITLA-GIDI DISENGAGEMENT LINE UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH EGYPT ON FINAL LINE TO WHICH ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS LINE OF REASONING IS BASED ON PREMISE THAT EACH SUCCESSIVE WITHDRAWAL PLACES IDF IN WORSE STRATEGIC POSITION. IN ADDITION, WITHDRAWAL TO MITLA-GIDI LINE LEAVES COSTLY INFRASTRUCTURE OF MILITARY SUPPORT FACILITIES BUILT PRIOR TO OCTOBER WAR STILL UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL WHEREAS ANOTHER WITHDRAWAL WOULD CAUSE ISRAEL TO ABANDON THESE FACILITIES AND TO HAVE TO RECONSTRUCT THEM AT GREAT EXPENSE. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE IN ISRAEL'S BEST INTEREST TO REFUSE TO MAKE ANY FURTHER WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT ON BASIS OF FINAL ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00596 02 OF 02 011138Z

45

ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25* IO-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

SAM-01 ACDA-19 EB-11 DPW-01 NIC-01 DRC-01 /159 W

----- 033862

O R 011042Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1352

INFO AMEMASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 0596

BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

4. EVEN THOSE ISRAELIS WHO PRECEIVE ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FROM WITHDRAWALS BEFORE FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT REACHED WITH EGYPT BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL MUST EXTRACT A VERY CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL PRICE FROM SADAT FOR NEXT STEP THAT ISRAEL TAKES. THIS POLITICAL PRICE HAS BEEN VARIOUSLY STATED TO INCLUDE AN EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF NON-BELLIGERENCY (SOMETHING ISRAEL WANTED IN CONTEXT OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BUT WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN), ISRAELI SHIPPING THROUGH SUEZ CANAL, AND/OR DEMILITARIZATION OF ANY ADDITIONAL AREA VACATED BY ISRAEL WITH IRONCLAD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00596 02 OF 02 011138Z

MEASURES FOR JOINT INSPECTION.

5. SYRIA TO CERTAIN EXTENT, SADAT HAS ALREADY DECIDED NEXT STEP IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY, THEREBY FORCING ISRAEL TO FOLLOW HIS LEAD. IN HIS WHIRLWIND TOUR OF ARAB COUNTRIES FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, SADAT STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT EGYPT WOULD TAKE NO FURTHER DIPLOMATIC STEPS WITH ISRAEL UNTIL AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. ISRAELIS SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT THIS WILL BE NEXT STEP AND EXPECT THAT IT WILL REQUIRE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT. IT TERMS OF DISENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA, HOWEVER, ISRAELIS SEE LESS URGENCY IN REACHING AGREEMENT THAN WAS THE CASE WITH EGYPT. IDF FINDS ITSELF IN MUCH BETTER SHAPE ON SYRIAN FRONT WITH SHORTER LINES OF SUPPLY THAN IN SINAI AND MUCH BETTER TACTICAL POSITION. WHILE IDF HAS SUFFERED CASUALTIES ON SYRIAN FRONT, ISRAEL DOES NOT SEE SITUATION HAVING AS MUCH POTENTIAL DANGER IN TERMS OF RENEWAL OF WAR AS WAS CASE WITH EGYPT. FINALLY, SIMPLE FACT OF TOPOGRAPHY ON NORTHERN FRONT MAKES DISENGAGEMENT A LESS ATTRACTIVE PROPOSAL--THERE IS NO "STRATEGIC DEPTH" AS IN SINAI WHICH BY NECESSITY MEANS THAT ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE LIMITED IN NATURE.

6. TO VERY LIMITED EXTENT, ISRAELIS DIMLY PRECEIVE THAT LACK

OF PROGRESS ON SYRIAN FRONT LIMITS SADAT'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITH ISRAEL. WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SIGNS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REALIZATION IS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN MINDS OF ISRAELIS IN DETERMINING WHERE TO GO FROM THIS POINT. IF ISRAELIS ARE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF SADAT'S INTENTIONS, THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY PARANOID ABOUT SYRIA'S. THIS FEELING IS OF COURSE COMPOUNDED BY POW PROBLEM, ONLY MAJOR FACTOR WHICH LENDS ANY DEGREE OF URGENCY TO DISENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA SINCE ONE SPINOFF OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE RELEASE OF ISRAELI POWS.

7. JORDAN AND PALESTINIANS. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT ISRAELIS HAVE FOCUSED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN OR HAVE ANY DESIRE TO DO SO, IN SPITE OF REPORTS APPEARING IN PRESS THAT SECRET CONTACTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN PAST FEW WEEKS BETWEEN SENIOR ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN OFFICIALS (TEL AVIV 560). WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT ISRAELIS ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO INDEPENDENT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00596 02 OF 02 011138Z

PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK AND TO SEPARATE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. AS NOTED REFTEL, ISSUE OF EVENTUAL DISPOSITION OF WEST BANK, AS WELL AS ANY LIMITED MOVE TOWARDS ISRAELI-JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT, IS EXPLOSIVE INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH LABOR ALIGNMENT WISHES TO AVOID FACING, PARTICULARLY AT THIS POINT IN TIME WHEN DELICATE CABINET NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY.

8. IN CONCLUSION, IMPRESSION OF ISRAELI PUBLIC IS THAT GOI HAS NOT DECIDED WHERE IT WANTS TO GO FROM HERE IN NEXT STEP TOWARDS PEACE. WHAT SEEMS TO BE UPPERMOST IN ISRAELI MINDS IS TO SLOW DOWN TEMPO OF PACE AND REEVALUATE ISRAEL'S STRATEGY AND GOALS. THIS PRESUPPOSES THAT ISRAEL WILL BE ABLE TO EXERT FAIR DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER PACE OF EVENTS-- SOMETHING THAT MIGHT NOT BE WITHIN ISRAEL'S POWER TO DO. KEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE WITHDRAWALS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, PEACE TALKS, INTERNATIONAL CANALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: rowelle0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974TELAV00596
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740260/aaaacenr.tel
Line Count: 262
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: rowelle0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <18 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <27-Sep-2002 by rowelle0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT COMES NEXT SUMMARY: ISRAELI LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL COMMENTATORS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005